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the failure

Partridge: The Failure of the Kirtland Safety Society

of the
kirtland safety society

SCOTT

H

PARTRIDGE

failure of the kirtland safety society the ohio mormon bank in 1837 has tended to promote extreme opinions
on the one hand it convinces critics of the church that the
early mormon leaders were knaves at worst or false prophets
cormons of
at best on the other hand it convinces many mormons
the wickedness of their enemies who helped bring about the
fall of the bank and who since that time have used its demise as an argument against the divinity of mormonism
the argument over the kirtland safety society is typical
of historical discussions in which much is made about the
facts of a situation it is as if the truth were somewhere
out there and if we could somehow manage to separate
fact from opinion we would know what really happened
this idea neglects to consider the point that the facts of history seldom come to us in pure form since they are always
filtered through the mind of the historian who wrote them 1
there are no facts waiting in splendid isolation for discovery
by the historian but only the observations of earlier writers
who had their own prejudices thus the anti mormon writer
who sees the facts as damning to the church and the pro
mormon writer who sees them as further proof of the validity
of his own argument might be wise in working to obtain a
broader perspective of the problem in order to reevaluate that
which they have come to accept as fact

the

11

dr
df

partridge is associate professor of business management at california
state university hayward he was a ford doctoral fellow at harvard where
he earned a doctor of business administration in marketing and business
history
when we take up a work of history our first concern should be
not with the facts which it contains but with the historian who wrote it
new york alfred A knopf 1965
edward hallett carr what Is history
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the

purpose of this paper is to reexamine the story of the
kirtland safety society in the light of what has been concluded
about that period by economic and business historians emphasis will be placed on the social and economic environment
within which the events took place it will reject out of hand
the extreme positions already mentioned because the significance of the failure of the kirtland safety society turns on
whether it was something unusual for the time and place
or whether it was a typical happening if it was typical it
then loses much of its significance as evidence for or against
the management skills of the mormon leadership how typical
or representative an institution might be in a given period
is crucial in the historical analysis of economic institutions
As stated by the british economic historian sir john clapevery economic historian should have acquired what
ham
might be called the statistical sense the habit of asking in
relation to any institution policy group or movement the
questions how large how long how often how repre
depre

tive
senta
sentative3
sentative
tentative
with this theoretical underpinning as a starting point the
1
main hypotheses of this paper are
that the events connected with the rise and fall of the kirtland safety society
were typical that they were representative of the years 18362 that the failure of the bank indicates little
1837 in ohio
more than that the bank like many others was unable to
weather the crisis of 1837 and 3 that like many others
it eventually failed admittedly this approach removes some
of the fun and excitement from the study of the subject but
it might in the long run provide a more realistic perspective
of this period in mormon history
A SHORT HISTORY

OF THE KIRTLAND SAFETY SOCIETY

areas of agreement some points relative to the story of
the kirtland safety society can be accepted as historical facts
with little argument specifically there seems to be general
agreement on the following
1
during the period prior to and including the operation
of the bank the church was in desperate financial difficulty
canceled

sir john clapham economic history as a discipline in frederick C
asst ed
enterprise and secular change
lane ed and jelle C riemersma abst
homewood illinois richard C irwin 1953 p 416
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol12/iss4/8

2

Partridge: The Failure of the Kirtland Safety Society

439

KIRTLAND SAFETY SOCIETY

quoting joseph smith

there are many causes of embar-

ras
rassment
sment of a pecuniary nature now pressing upon the heads
of the church 4 the causes of this embarrassment were 1 1
that the church had no means of support except the contributions of its members who were themselves not wealthy
and 2 that it had assumed obligations in excess of its limited
ability to pay 5 they began poor were needy destitute and
were truly afflicted by their enemies yet the lord commanded
them to go forth and preach the gospel to sacrifice their
time their talents their good name and jeopardize their lives
and in addition to this they were to build a house for the
lord and prepare for the gathering of the saints thus it is
easy to see this must have involved them in financial difficulties 6 in addition to promoting extensive missionary effort
and the building of the temple the church had entered into
large contracts for purchase of land in the kirtland area 7
2 church leaders believed that a financial institution in
kirtland would help solve some of the financial problems of
the mormon community they had the choice of establishing
a regular state chartered bank or a joint stock association with
limited powers to issue notes 8
3
the mormon leaders were unsuccessful in obtaining a
bank charter from the state of ohio either they were refused
a charter as joseph smith states 9 or they were persuaded of
the uselessness of attempting to obtain one from an unfriendly
anti bank democrats 10 in any case
legislature dominated by antibank
although they would have been pleased to obtain a charter
they were apparently unable to do so
4 the founders selected the alternative of organizing a
joint stock company with note issuing powers this bank
banking comthey called the kirtland safety society Anti
antibanking
pany joseph smith as treasurer signed the promissory notes
issued by the society the articles of incorporation established
regular procedures for management and auditing the affairs
joseph smith history of the church of
saints ed B H roberts 7 vols salt lake city
2478 hereafter referred to as HC
robert kent fielding the growth of the
disser
dissertation
tat on indiana university
doctoral dissertat
ohio
dissertate
ap 478
79
HC pp
47879
WC
HC p 479
fielding p 177
WC
HC p 468
fielding p 180
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of the organization and set the liability of individual members at 100000
5
joseph smith encouraged the members of the church
to come to kirtland and invest in the kirtland safety society
we invite the brethren from
As he stated in his history
abroad to call on us and take stock in our safety sociyil
yli
illn
ety
6 the notes of the mormon bank were accepted in the
community for a time and evidently improved the commercial
health of kirtland 12 the capital base of the society was the
land owned under mortgage by church members the society
would issue notes to land owners and receive in return a
mort
mortgage
oale
aale on the land this mortgage then became an asset
against which additional notes could be issued although the
capital structure of the mormon bank was unquestionably
weak
apparently a large segment of public opinion received it favorably and did not regard it as unusual 13
7 the condition of the society declined as a spirit of
speculation swept through the membership and leadership of
the church itself14
itself14 and as the financial condition of the state
and nation exerted great pressure on all banks
8 joseph smith withdrew from association with the bank
15
and warned the saints against
sometime before 7 july 1837
183715
1857
accepting the bills of the society as he said 1 I know them
to be detrimental to the best interests of society as well as to
the principles of religion 16
9 the kirtland safety society failed in the summer of
1837 and those holding its notes were unable to recover any
of the face value
10 the failure of the bank caused a great amount of criticism outside the church and bitterness among church members even some of the twelve apostles used it as justification
for misconduct in office 17

areas of disagreement if there is general agreement with
regard to the above statements there is general disagreement
p
hc
fielding

ibid p
UHC
HC p
jhc
5hc p
HC
1hc p
HC
jhc
WC
HC p

473
p 191
.177
177

487
497
507
50788
509 10
50910
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KIRTLAND SAFETY SOCIETY

in other areas A partial list of the areas of disagreement
would include the following

what were the motives for beginning the kirtland

1

safety society
what responsibility did joseph smith share for the
failure of the bank
what was the financial strength of the bank relative
to other banks of the area in that period was it

2
3

typical

did the bank fail

because it was caught in events
beyond the control of its management or did it fail
because it was mismanaged
what significance does the failure of the kirtland
safety society have within the context of mormon history does it prove anything

4

5

it

is not pretended that definitive answers to all or any
of these questions can be developed in this paper but it is

hoped that an examination of the events surrounding the
story of the mormon bank will throw some light on them
at this point it might be useful to outline the history of
american banking during the first few decades of the nineteenth century
1840
1800
18001840
general economic and social background the three decades prior to 1838 were particularly crucial ones in the economic growth of the united states it was during this period
that the nation s economy began to accelerate and industrialization was born 18 along with these rapid changes in economic
life the country was also undergoing profound adjustments
in social outlook the jeffersonian ideal that life liberty and
the pursuit of happiness were best attained by the yeoman
farmer was being replaced new immigrants were coming
from europe who had more aggressive economic motives than
did their predecessors in the previous century and people were
greatly excited by the prospects of becoming rich writing
about this period bray hammond noted that

ECONOMIC AMERICA

18

1860

laisser faire A violent
liberty became transformed into gaisser
douglass north the economic growth of the united states
englewood cliffs
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aggressive economic individualism became established the
democracy became greedy intolerant imperialistic and lawless it opened economic advantages to those who had not
previously had them
wealth was won and lost lost
and won patient accumulation was condemned people believed it was not what they saved but what they made that
among men of every age and every position
counted
in society through all grades was the same all pervading
all engrossing anxiety to grow rich 19

thus the jacksonian revolution signified that the traditional conservative methods of business and banking were
no longer acceptable to westerners eager to reap personal
profit from the rapidly developing frontier in particular the
westerner rejected the methods and advice of much more conserva tive eastern capitalists the feeling was that anyone in
servative
bad a
america could get rich through his own efforts if he
be had
little luck
it is no surprise that under such conditions where raw
materials and labor were readily available where entrepreneurial talent was abundant the limiting factor on productive growth would be a shortage of capital As herman
krooss summarized it As a general proposition the american economy was characterized by a chronic shortage of
capital and capital funds 20 it was this insatiable demand for
capital funds that spurred the rapid growth of financial intermediaries
terme diaries in the western states prior to 1840
speculation and inflation the general rate of economic
expansion in the united states was comparatively slow until
the 1820s thereafter it picked up momentum and increased
rapidly until brought to an end by the crash in 1837 21 in the
southwest and northwest speculative land sales grew tremendously reaching a peak in 1856
1836 22 in addition to over
trading in land speculations in unimproved town lots mines
and every description of rash undertakings increased at the
same rate 23 the whole nation was in a fever of expansion
and excitement stimulated by streams of immigrants and capi
bray hammond banks and politics in america from the revolution to
the civil war princeton NJ princeton university press 1957
p 27
herman E krooss american economic development englewood cliffs
NJ prentice hall 1955 p 206
p 190
igo
north
2
ibid p 199
james S gallatin the banks of new york their dealers etc new
york 1858 p 82
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tal goods pouring in from europe the situation was well
summarized by J M balestier when he wrote that
so utterly reckless had the community grown that they chased
every bubble that floated in the speculative atmosphere
madness increased in proportion to the foulness of its

ailment the more absurd the project the more remote the
object the more madly they were pursued the prairies
of illinois the forests of wisconsin and the sand hills of
michigan presented a chain almost unbroken of supposititious villages and cities the whole land seemed staked out
and peopled on paper if a man were reputed to be fortunate his touch like that of midas was supposed to turn
everything into gold and the crowd entered blindly into
every project he might originate 24
WESTERN BANKING

growth of western banks

the

net effect of all this
speculative madness was to induce an unprecedented inflation
of bank credit which in turn further encouraged speculative
activity in 1790 there were only three commercial banks in
the united states with a total capital of 2100000 by 1829
this had increased to 329 banks with 110000000 and by
1837 it had reached 788 banks with capitalization of
290000000
290000000 25
andrew jackson s veto of the bank recharter bill in 1836
which ended the life of the bank of the united states helped
to bring matters to a climax although certainly not a perfect
institution the bank had helped to impose some restraint on
a fundamentally weak and unstable american banking system with the demise of the bank one didn
dian t have to be a
prophet to agree with the editor of niles register that the
rag system will become as perfect as ever it was after the restraining power of the bank of the united states shall cease
every nook and corner of our country will again have its own
rag shop and currency 226 thus in addition to a tremendous
increase in the number and capitalization of state banks note
circulation more than doubled between 1830 and 1837 loans
and discounts increased from less than 200 million to over
F cyril james the growth of chicago banks vol 1I p 100 quoted in
sister M grace madeleine monetary and banking theories of jacksonian
Kennikat press 1943
democracy port washington N Y kennikat
p 84
august C bolino the development of the american economy columbus ohio charles E merrill books 1961
p 188

madeleine p 69
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banks were able and willing to meet the demand for money by the simple process of exchanging the
notes of a bank for the promissory note or bill of exchange of
a firm or individual ie by exchanging one kind of debt for
another the evidence of a bank s debt had general acceptability as a medium of exchange the evidence of a firm s or
individual s debt did not thus by monetizing private debt
the growing demand for money was met
the specific motives for establishing banks varied consider ably in some cases state governments encouraged the
siderably
formation of banks since they helped promote commerce and
facilitated the raising of funds for public works the federal
government also encouraged the inflationary expansion of
state banks by accepting their notes in payment for public
lands and by building up their reserves through the deposit of
public moneys in addition the upsurge of laissez faire encouraged the notion that anyone had the right to engage in
couraged
business and banking and finally in areas where capital
was particularly scarce there was great public demand for
term loans on poor security and hence a great increase
long
longterm
both in banks and in the issuance of notes because of this
demand and because in the more backward regions there
was a general ignorance of banking principles and procedures
coupled with laxity in the enforcement of those banking laws
that existed
500 million

27

unstable banking moved with the frontier there the demand for credit was linked to investment in fixed capital
which often combined high potential productivity with high
risk
during the 1830s boom and bust banking was
particularly prevalent in two regions one bounded by upstate new york ohio and michigan and the other on the
288
southern frontier

in addition to banks started in response to the demand for
capital and an economic need for their services there were
some that were started with the motive of reaping a quick
profit and getting out schemes were concocted by men
without capital seeking to obtain credit which would be denied by legitimate sources those who were desperately in
paul studenski and herman E krooss financial history of the united
states new york mcgraw hill book company 1963
p 107
paul B trescott financing american enterprise new york harper &
row publishers 1963 p 24
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol12/iss4/8
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debt often believed that the best way to escape their difficulties was to join together with other debtors and make a
bank the result was a number of amusing and sometimes
tragic episodes the term wildcat banking for example
arose from the practice of locating redemption offices in inaccessible spots such as the depths of a forest where there
prowere few human habitations but plenty of wildcats
moters of this kind of bank were little more than counter
felters since they had no intention of running a regular banking institution however these people were in a very minor
position in the banking structure of the time and in spite of
the implication to the contrary of some writers of history
their importance should not be exaggerated since quantita21
tively they probably were not of great significance 29
the
fundamental reason for the growth of banks was the urgent
need for credit in a nation that was experiencing rapid economic growth brought on by technological changes and the
establishment of new industries 30
bank failures there were many bank failures during the
1830s but the exact number will likely never be known this
scarcity of data was lamented by john jay knox in 1900 the
losses to the public under the various state systems of banking
were undoubtedly large as may be gathered from the detailed history of the several states exactly how large will never
be known because the records of the period in this respect
are surprisingly incomplete 31 from the few sources available knox concluded that it is probable that the loss to
note holders was about five percent per annum and the
losses to depositors and stockholders cannot be definitely ascertained
certa ined 32 the losses from the failures of the banks under
these ill advised systems of banking have never and will prob1836 eighty nine
ably never be calculated on november 1 1856
state banks held over forty nine millions of public deposits and
twenty six millions of individual deposits they had outstanding about forty six millions of dollars in circulation in
less than a year all but six of these had suspended 33 in
harold F williamson the growth of the american economy
p 236
wood cliffs NJ prentice hall 1951
256
bolino p 192
john jay knox A history of banking in the united states
p 315
bradford rhodes & company 1903
ibid
ibid p 13
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summary some indication of the failure record of state banks
during this period can be gleaned from the comment by
trescott that nearly one half of the banks formed between
1810 and 1820 failed before 1825 and a similar proportion
of the banks formed between 1830 and 1840 closed by 1845 34

why banks failed some banks failed because they were
never meant to succeed it is not hard to find cases of outright fraud and dishonesty in bank failures of the period for
example michigan s free bank act of 1837 provided that any
person or resident of the state desirous of establishing a bank
might do so the result was a system under which some
bankers spent most of their energies in outwitting examiners
rather than in conducting useful banking activity in at least
one case a bank filled its specie kegs with glass lead and
ten penny nails topping these materials off with silver to
tenpenny
fool the examiners 35
the more usual case was bank failure as the result of imprudence and inexperience rather than outright dishonesty
entry into banking was easy and frequently the officials of a
failed institution would plead as a defense as managers of
a massachusetts bank did that they were not themselves
capitalists nor men of previous experience in banking and
acquired their first knowledge of its rules and principles in
this comparatively humble institution 36
but these were strictly minor reasons for bank failures
during the first half of the nineteenth century most economic
historians do not believe that banks at that time were usually
operated by unprincipled men for selfish ends more typically
it is the consensus that the instability of bank credit was inherent in the structure of the banking system and involved
factors beyond the control of individual banks the main
flaw in state banking in the 1830s was that it was predominantly a rural institution and had little liquidity or shift
ability in the large cities of the east loans could be liquidated that is turned into cash quickly by simply calling
for payment but this could not be done in the outlying areas
this viewpoint is nicely summarized by herman krooss
trescott
frescott p 19
ross M robertson history of the american economy new york
harcourt brace & world 1955 p 175
camH E miller banking theories in the united states before 1860 xann
cann
bridge harvard university press 1927 p 8
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol12/iss4/8
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the

basic weakness of most state commercial banks
lay in the fact that they were attempting to do a commercial banking business on the basis of savings bank
assets that could not be easily turned into cash only in the
large cities were banks able to carry on genuine commercial banking for only where industry was located could
banks make enough short term commercial loans to maintain
liquidity in small towns and country districts banks made
long term loans against farm mortgages and issued short
longterm
term liabilities in the form of bank notes to borrowers the
borrowers in turn used the bank notes to purchase commodities
modi ties mostly capital goods from industrial and commercial centers when the notes were presented for redemption the average state bank could not turn its assets
into cash fast enough to meet these demands and found it
difficult to maintain specie payments bank notes circulated at a discount and often became completely worthless 37

thus the

reckless and inexperienced management of many
state banks was combined with a scarcity of productive commercial loans to create a state banking system with grave
weaknesses As a consequence most state banks fulfilled
their functions at the expense of constant bank failures violent business fluctuations and enormous losses to note
noteholders
holders
and depositors
summary

it

is difficult to overstate the chaos

that existed
in american banking during the first half of the nineteenth
century so little faith was had in the stock of new banks that
some states made it illegal for religious and educational organizations to invest in them 38 in fact by the 1840s the reaction
to wildcat banking had become so strong that nine states made
all banking illegal 39 experience with banking instability led
one prominent journalist to remark in 1833 that banks were
the principal source of social evil in the united states and
found expression in the hope of james guthrie secretary of
the treasury that the production of gold in california would
shortly enable the country to dispense entirely with bank
money

40

on the other hand admitting that banking during this

period was inefficient many students of american economic
krooss p 229
williamson p 236
robertson
obertson

p

176

william M gouge A short history of paper money and banking in
part 1I pp
the united states philadelphia T W ustick 1833
ap 42 133
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1972
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development contend that in the long run it acted to promote
growth studenski and krooss in their definitive financial
history of the united states state that inefficient banking
had some advantages it was one of the roots of prosperity
as well as pain and it is questionable whether a conservative
banking policy would have made possible the rapid economic
development of the west which took place under loose banking 41
THE CRASH OF 1837

bank failures like many other banks the kirtland safety
society went under in the great crash of 1837 this depression which had national and international repercussions hit
particularly hard in the state of ohio ohio banks with one
41
exception refused to pay their notes during the emergency 42
the situation became so serious that the ohio legislature in
december of 1837 by resolution required the auditor of the
state to obtain from state banks general statements as to their
condition one of the questions asked was what were the
causes which led them to suspend specie payments
in response the cashier of the lancaster ohio bank replied in
a summary which was accepted as a rationale for most of the
other banks

at

the time the ohio banks declined the redemption of
their bills with specie they were apprised that the banks of
the states north and south east and west had generally
if not universally suspended specie payments the ohio
banks were well aware that a continuance of specie payments
under such conditions would subject them to heavy and
constant drafts on their coin and that too by banks of other
states which had closed their doors to this mode of payment they deemed it gross folly nay worse highly
criminal to continue a course of operation which must result in abstracting to their full amount the precious metals
from ohio while so far as they could see no corresponding
benefit would result therefrom in this condition of the
monetary affairs of the country and with the further embarrassment
barras sment arising from the refusal of the land offices to
receive bank paper in payment of the public lands the
ohio banks felt it to be an imperative duty to adopt the
course they did for the purpose of guarding against conse
studenski and krooss p 108
nox p 677
knox
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol12/iss4/8
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quencas
quences which they foresaw must prove fatal to the banks
and disastrous to the best interests of the state 43

crisis in state finances the severity of the depression is
illustrated by the fact that in addition to nearly universal
failure of the state banks to redeem their notes the state government itself was in dire financial difficulties the state
was engaged in numerous building activities having been
swept up in the canal building mania of the time and had
sold securities to the public to gain funds in addition it had
borrowed over a million dollars from two of the larger state
banks with which to continue the work during the crisis the
state found itself unable to meet its obligations 44 in the legislature opposition to the canal projects expressed itself in a
desire to repudiate the debts but eventually the credit of the
state was saved by a mr alfred kelly who personally raised
a quarter of a million dollars to tide things over
thus not only was the state banking structure put in a difficult position by the crash but the financial strength of the
state of ohio itself was unable to weather the storm the
net result of the lessons learned during this period was the
passage in 1845 of reform banking legislation establishing
requirements for those wishing to engage in bank operations

conclusions

the purpose

of the above discussion has been to lay a firm
groundwork for dealing with areas in which there is not general agreement concerning the historical implications of the
failure of the kirtland safety society in this part of the
paper an attempt will be made first to deal with one of
the most scholarly of the works dealing with the events under
discussion by dr robert kent fielding and secondly to tie
tic
tle
the analysis back into the five areas of disagreement outlined
at the beginning of this paper

the fielding thesis

in 1957 robert kent fielding completed a well written and scholarly thesis entitled the growth
of the mormon church in kirtland ohio as part of the requirements of the doctoral program at indiana university 45
quirements
A large chapter in his work is devoted to a study of the kirt
41

ibid p 675
ibid p 679
4fielding
fielding p 177
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land safety society and a number of students of mormonism
have expressed some dissatisfaction with the treatment accorded the early leaders of the church this writer tends
to side with the critics rather than with the supporters of
fielding s work even while acknowledging that his work is
carefully done and well supported by the data he has selected
disagreement is not so much with the evidence fielding presents but with the conclusions that he draws specifically he
makes the following assertions
1

A basic cause of the relatively desperate financial condition of the church was that it had undertaken obligations beyond its ability to pay

the

implication of this statement is that the leadership
of the mormon church was less prudent than other managers
of organizations at the time yet undertaking financial obligations beyond the ability to pay was almost the national
pastime during the first half of the nineteenth century the
booster element in american society wanted to accomplish
everything and wanted it done as soon as possible As a
result states municipalities and business organizations regularly undertook projects beyond their ability to pay and also
regularly defaulted on their obligations the situation of the
church was typical for the time and place
2

the

position of the mormon merchant was particularly
difficult with goods both bought and sold on credit
and the constant fear of failure through insufficient
funds to pay obligations

that the situation of mormon
merchants was relatively worse than other merchants of the
time yet careful study of the development of marketing
institutions in the united states shows that the situation fielding describes was very common during the period under consideration the general store was the typical retail outlet and
farmers were the typical customers because farm income
tends to come in an annual lump it was the custom to establish long lines of credit down the distribution line from
manufacturer to the final consumer and the representative
frontier merchant did indeed buy and sell goods on credit
professor theodore marburg writing on marketing and
trade before 1865 notes that a large portion of sales were
charged on open book account with a closing of the books

again the implication

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol12/iss4/8
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taking place only once a year such infrequent settlement
was suited to the shortage of cash and the confused currency
conditions prior to 1865 but the extension of credit to purchasers added to retailing costs and it increased the local merchant s dependence upon credit from jobbers 46
3

the kirtland

the child of desperation which was to solve all the problem of debts
credits capital needs unemployment etc

again there

safety society was

is nothing unusual in the situation as de-

scribed for the time and place in question many frontier banks
were organized for just the purposes described it should be
kept in mind that the techniques of running a bank were
often not well known by people who organized them and
that a bank was considered by many a frontier community
to be the agent of salvation for their problems after all
these people were rich if we measure the value of the farmland they owned the problem was that many frontier bankers lacked a firm understanding of the problems they were
creating by using this agricultural land as the basis for distributing redeemable notes
4

the

bank was organized from the beginning without
a hope of success
to a banker the articles fairly
shouted this is a wildcat beware

this

the

question of whether the bank had a
hope of success was dependent on a great number of factors
including the national and state economic climates certainly
the founders believed that it had a hope of success based on
experience over the previous decade or they would not have
organized it As for the kirtland safety society s being a
wildcat bank the charge is wrong by definition A wildcat
bank was one in which the managers of the bank made a
deliberate effort to evade paying off notes by making the
place of redemption inaccessible to those trying to trade notes
for specie certainly the middle of kirtland was not the best
place to hide the headquarters of the kirtland safety society
if the principles of sound banking were not always known
the principles of wildcat banking were
5

is nonsense

1837 was not a good time to start a bank and warnings
to that effect were plentiful in the newspapers

williamson p 512
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mr fielding knows that and I1 know it but 1I am not sure
that the founders of the kirtland safety society knew it the

prevailing atmosphere was one of optimism and not until the
crash actually came did most people believe what was to be
the same argument can be stated with regard to the great
crash of 1929 all indicators in retrospect indicate that
something was liable to happen yet the greatest minds of the
country persisted in the notion that we had reached a permanent plateau of prosperity
6

the

fall of the bank was not caused by the poor business conditions and bank failures of 1837 but by the
poor judgment of its leaders and the lack of a firm
economic base within the mormon community

this

is the heart of

dr

fielding s argument and one with
which I1 must strongly disagree even a casual student of mormon history must admit that the early leaders of the church
undertook tasks that good judgment would have cautioned them not to undertake the sending of missionaries to
england during the darkest hour of persecution the building
of the kirtland temple the establishment of nauvoo and the
construction of its temple the long trek west to the rocky
mountains the establishment of a viable independent economy
in the isolation of utah territory all were actions that more
timid souls would not have undertaken combined with a
willingness to take great risks in the hopes of great gains was
a characteristic pragmatic philosophy that tried new things
and that turned to other programs when failures occurred the
historian can logically judge that the establishment of the
kirtland safety society was the result of poor judgment but
at the same time should acknowledge that given more favorable economic conditions it might well have succeeded as
did other even more difficult undertakings attempted by the
early mormon leaders the establishment of the kirtland
safety society was one of many activities undertaken with
the goal of establishing mormonism on a solid footing in
western america that it should fail given the circumstances
is not particularly surprising what is important is that after
its failure those responsible recognized their failure and tried
again in other ways

areas of disagreement to return to the areas of disagreement referred to earlier we can summarize the conclu
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sions reached in this look into the economic and social environment
vironment within which the mormon bank existed

what were the motives for beginning the kirtland safety
society
like most other banks of the time on the western
frontier the mormon bank began because its founders were in
desperate need of credit there are certainly indications that
they lacked knowledge and skill in banking but on the
other hand there is no evidence produced to demonstrate that
there was ever an intent to defraud the kirtland safety society was not a wildcat bank but simply one of a great number
of banks organized by men with little banking experience but
with a lot of hope that a bank would help solve some of their
problems
what responsibility does joseph smith share for the failure
daug he seems to share in the failure with those
dauk
hank
of the bank
others who were involved in its formation and early management there is no need to shield him or any other early mormon leader from association with its failure the early history
of the church is one continuous struggle against opposition
and eventual success was preceded by many failures and disappointments the failure of the bank indicates only that
something was tried and that it failed but little more certainly
joseph smith was partly responsible but that fact should not
be built into something more than it is

what

was the financial strength of the bank relative to
other banks of the area in that period was it typical A
reasonable conclusion would be that the financial strength of
the society was not equal to all other banks at that time in
ohio but that it was within a broad range somewhat typical
of banks that failed to survive the crash of 1837 it suffered
as has been shown from the chronic difficulty of being based
on agricultural land which could not be converted into specie
to redeem notes and this was typical for the time

did

the bank fail because it was caught in
in events beyond
the control of its management or did it fail because it was
mismanaged the answers to both of these questions are
positive the bank was caught in events beyond the control
of its management and it was also mismanaged again however this was typical of banking at the time remembering
that half the banks organized during the 1830s failed by
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it is obvious that it was a risky business there were
not many competent bank managers anywhere certainly not
many on the ohio frontier but even if endowed with superb
management it is doubtful that the bank could have sur1845

vived the crisis of 1857
1837

what significance

does the failure of the kirtland safety
society have within the context of mormon history does it

prove anything

the

conclusion here is that the failure of the mormon
bank has only passing significance insofar as mormon history
is concerned the part played by joseph smith and early
church leaders was real but to return to an earlier comment
by sir john clapham one s statistical sense would indicate that the failure of the kirtland safety society was a
very typical event for ohio in 1837 when many other banks
and the state itself were having grave financial difficulties
when the proper operation of financial institutions was not
well understood and when credit was in such short supply
that banks were viewed as devices to somehow magically
solve the universal problem of debt A reasonable attitude
would be to accept this particular effort as unsuccessful and
admire those who failed for their ability to pick up the pieces
and move on to greater effort and accomplishment
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